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Abstract
Privacy uncertainty manifests itself when a customer’s personal information is part of a
technology mediated interaction. Theoretically and empirically, in context of mobile apps, we
show that privacy uncertainty is different from seller uncertainty and product uncertainty. In
addition, we explore the antecedents of privacy uncertainty, where we focus on how prepurchase and post-purchase information asymmetry about privacy information effects privacy
uncertainty. We empirically test our hypothesis and find that post-purchase information
asymmetry leads to more pronounced privacy uncertainty.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a new construct, privacy uncertainty, which is the difficulty of the
consumer to assess the privacy of their information. In an empirical study in the context of
mobile apps, we show that, in addition to seller uncertainty and product uncertainty, privacy
uncertainty significantly affects consumers’ willingness to buy. Then, we delve into privacy
uncertainty and determine the nature of information asymmetry which leads to privacy
uncertainty.
1.1

Uncertainty in IS
As summarized in Table 1, different types of uncertainties manifest due the nature of a

transaction. Pavlou et al. (2007) conceptualized seller uncertainty as a consumer problem where
the consumer cannot determine whether the seller is actually selling the product he claims. The
research considers both dimensions of whether the seller is presenting accurate information about
the product and whether the seller will meet its claims after the sale of the product. Trust (Pavlou
and Fygenson 2006) and reputation building mechanisms play an important part in improving the
market. In addition, the SSL and third party certifications provide structural assurance and
reduce the issues of providing financial information during online transactions.
E-commerce platforms allow sellers to increase the variety of products they can sell,
including used goods. The proliferation of selling products that cannot be readily evaluated by
the consumers introduces product uncertainty (Dimoka et al. 2012; Ghose 2009). Product
uncertainty refers to consumer’s difficulty in evaluating the quality of the product and how it will
perform in the future (Dimoka et al. 2012)
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Table 1: IS Literature on Measuring Uncertainty
Transacted Good

Exchange

Transaction
Frequency

Physical Product (Pavlou Seller: Product
et al., 2007)
Buyer: Money

One –Time

Used/New Physical
Seller: Product
Product (Dimoka et al.,
Buyer: Money
2012; Ghose, 2009)

One –Time

Uncertainty Measured and
Context
Seller (Surveyed people who bought
books and prescription drugs)

Repeat Business

Repeat Business

Product (Used cars bought over
ebay, uncertainty measured by
coders)
Product (Used goods, high quality
goods took longer to sell)

Software Apps (current Seller: App
One Time
research)
Buyer: Money and
Continuous
Personal Information
Repeat Business

Seller, Product, and privacy (Mobile
apps market)

While physical products are commonly sold and technologies have come into place to
accommodate these sales, the Internet has also created opportunity for selling of software
services in form of platforms (such as Facebook, Twitter and Google Search) or independent
software applications, such as, Apps on Facebook or mobile phone. The key distinction between
these new software products and physical goods is a continuous interaction of the consumer with
the seller’s platforms. While some of these software products or services can be purchased, most
of them are free. Consumers, in effect, pay for these free products and services by sharing their
personal information and usage patterns. These two components (personal information and usage
pattern) can be combined to develop profiles of consumers and consequently serve behavioral
and targeted advertisements. Thus, consumers’ behavior and their information both become part
of the transaction.
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Consequently, when consumers consider using these products, they would be interested in
determining how the seller handles their personal information. In order to understand this
phenomenon, we focus on mobile apps, as they are extensively used and provide us with a fertile
ground to study this phenomenon. Consumers download apps which can be free or purchased.
Almost all apps require some personal information that can be used within the app or for
additional purposes such as serving behavioral advertisement to the consumers. When a
consumer is deciding on the using such a product, they will need to consider how sharing of this
information will affect their privacy; hence buyers confront uncertainty about their privacy.

2 Theoretical Model
Since product and seller uncertainties have been studied in the literature, due to the space
limitation, we will not discuss them explicitly in this manuscript and we treat them as control
variables influencing the willingness to buy in our model.
2.1

Privacy Uncertainty
In addition to product uncertainty and seller uncertainty, we propose that buyers also

experience privacy uncertainty. Almost all the apps sold online collect and use some form of
personal information, either to enhance the operation and capability of the apps or to use that
information to advertise. Moreover, in most cases the information is passed to the app seller and
or to app-stores (such as Apple or Google). The collected information is usually stored on the
app seller’s servers, which may be managed by the app seller or rented. In some cases, the
information may be passed onto third party information aggregators who may be situated in
another country.
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The uncertainty arises, as first the buyer may not know what personal information was
collected. In addition, once the app has been purchased, the buyer does not know how collected
the information will be used and protected in the future. The app seller can choose to use the
information as per industry norms or misuse the information by further selling it to other
information aggregators. In addition, there is a chance that app seller’s servers are hacked by a
malicious user and buyer’s personal information is stolen (e.g. Sony, LinkedIn). Thus, the buyer
is confronted with uncertainty about his privacy state in the future, which in turn is dependent on
seller’s intentions, seller’s capabilities, seller’s supplier’s capabilities and other external events
such as hacker attacks. When considering privacy, individuals usually have no clear way of
estimating the likelihood and the consequences of privacy (Acquisti and Grossklags 2007). In
absence of any privacy related information, consumers will not have any ability to assess their
future privacy state. Hence, privacy uncertainty is defined as buyer’s difficulty in assessing the
privacy of his information accessed by the app.
2.2

Privacy Uncertainty and Willingness to Buy
Similar to seller uncertainty (Pavlou et al. 2007) and product uncertainty (Dimoka et al.

2012), privacy uncertainty also reduces the willingness to buy.
Privacy uncertainty refers to the degree to which the consumer cannot predict the stage of
her privacy in the future. The future state could vary from none to various levels of privacy
breaches, such as information sold to a third party leading to spamming or unwanted behavioral
advertisements, or information hacked by malicious users leading to identity theft.
Since uncertainty is a perception and consumers tend to overestimates losses (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979), high level of uncertainty will cause consumers to predict high level of
privacy failure in future. In such a scenario, the consumer will refrain from buying an app.
Proceedings of the Ninth Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Auckland, New Zealand, 2014
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Hypothesis 1: In mobiles apps, privacy uncertainty reduces willingness to buy.

3 Antecedents of Privacy Uncertainty: Information Asymmetry
In previous section, we defined privacy uncertainty and described its effect on consumers’
willingness to buy beyond those of seller uncertainty and product uncertainty. Now, we focus on
the antecedents of privacy uncertainty to understand how it arises.
Our theoretical model builds on economics, marketing and IS, where the primary source of
uncertainty is information asymmetry in the market. In the context of e-business, Pavlou et al.
(2007) identified four antecedents of uncertainty in online transactions: information asymmetry,
fears of seller opportunism, trust and privacy concerns. Both information asymmetry and fears of
seller opportunism are derived from the agency theory, while privacy concerns and trust arise out
of the cognitive decision making of the consumers.
While all four dimensions are important in understanding uncertainty, we focus on the
concepts from agency theory, notably pre and post purchase information asymmetry. We make
this choice as we consider app selling markets to be highly competitive, where app sellers are
usually small development shops or individuals, and they do not have many products. In such
markets, trust and reputation mechanisms are not successful (Dulleck et al. 2011). Similarly,
when we consider privacy concerns, consistent with majority of IS literature (Dinev et al. 2013;
Smith et al. 2011), we assume that privacy as a concern rather than a state, thus limiting the
influence of the seller in the brief encounter with consumers.
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Figure1. Theoretical Model for Information Asymmetry and its effects on Privacy Uncertainty
Figure 1 shows our conceptual model in which we consider different dimensions of privacy
information that cause information asymmetry and finally how this information asymmetry
causes privacy uncertainty. When we consider sources of information asymmetry, we focus on
the dimensions of privacy information that can help consumer reduce information asymmetry
and develop a better understanding of how their personal information is used by the app. There
are three types of information sources that affect information asymmetry. In terms of prepre
purchase information asymmetry, we consider hidden information, while in terms of post
purchase we consider hidden action and hidden effort.
3.1

Sources of Information Asymmetry
When the consumer considers buying of a mobile app thatt involves transaction of personal

information,, she has is confronted with information asymmetry about privacy of her information.
This information asymmetry arises due to the lack of certain aspects of how her information is
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managed by the mobile app. More explicitly, the buyer needs to know information about three
different aspects of transaction related to her personal information.
•

At the time of transaction, whether the app-seller is collecting only relevant information.

•

After the app has been bought, whether the information collected will be misused.

•

After the app has been bought, whether app-seller has appropriate technologies (firewall,
encryption etc.) in place to protect consumer’s information collected from malicious users.

3.2

Nature of Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry arises when, compared to consumer, the seller of the product has

more information about the quality of the product. The consumer can only find out about the
product after the product has been bought and used. From a consumer's perspective, this lack of
information causes uncertainty in the quality of the product. This uncertainty can arise before or
after the purchase of the product. At pre-purchase level, the buyer is trying to interpret whether
the information presented by the seller is accurate and complete, while at post-purchase, the
buyer tries to interpret whether the claims made by the seller remain true even after the purchase.
The informational aspects affect different types of information asymmetry: hidden
information, hidden action and hidden knowledge, where the hidden information is pre-purchase
and both hidden action and hidden knowledge are post-purchase. Each of these information
asymmetries then causes privacy uncertainty.
Table 2. Nature of Privacy Information and its Effects
Privacy Information
Collection
Use
Protection

Nature
Pre-purchase
Post-purchase
Post-purchase

Effects
Hidden Information
Hidden Effort, Hidden Action
Hidden Effort, Hidden Action
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3.2.1

Hidden Information (Information Asymmetry)

We define hidden information as consumer’s perception that the App-Sellers have more
knowledge of what personal information about the consumer is being collected but they may not
honestly report this information to the consumers. Hidden information occurs at a pre-contractual
level (Akerlof 1970) when a consumer perceives that the sellers have more information and they
do not disclose it. In context of mobile apps, this will translate into apprehension of the
consumers that the app-seller may not report all relevant information about what and why
consumer's personal information is collected. At the time of purchase, a seller can easily disclose
all the personal information that is collected by the app because the app seller is always better
informed than the consumer about which information is collected. If the app seller does not
inform the consumer about which personal information is collected, the consumer will become
apprehensive that the seller is withholding this information.
Hypothesis 2: Absence of information about “information collection” will
increase perception of hidden information.
Furthermore, if a consumer thinks that the seller is hiding something about what personal
information is being collected, she will be less certain about her privacy. In other words, a
consumer’s privacy uncertainty will increase if she perceives that the seller is hiding information
about what information is being collected by the app.
Hypothesis 3: A high level of perceived hidden information will increase level
of privacy uncertainty.
3.2.2

Hidden Action (Fear of Seller Opportunism)

Hidden action is defined as consumer’s perceptions that, given a profitable opportunity, the Appsellers may not act according to their (App-seller’s) proposed privacy claims/guidelines. Hidden
action is a post-contractual issue (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1992), where the consumer believes
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that the sellers "need an incentive to act obediently according to the plan" (Myerson 2013). Thus,
the consumer fears that the seller will renege on their stated claims and compromise her personal
information by either misusing the information or by not protecting the information as claimed.
When we consider privacy information, both information use and information protection are
concerned with post purchase activities. Information use is related to how the app will use
consumer’s personal information after it has been collected by the app, whereas information
protection is concerned with how consumer’s personal information will be protected after it has
been collected by the app.
Hypothesis 4: Absence of information about “information use” will increase
the perception of hidden action.
Hypothesis 5: Absence of information about “information protection” will
increase the perception of hidden action.
Similar to the effect of hidden information on privacy uncertainty, we would expect that
increase in hidden action would lead the consumer to have high privacy uncertainty. This is
primarily because if the buyer cannot be sure of how the seller will behave in the future she
cannot be sure how her privacy will fare. While the app seller may or may not misbehave in the
future, having no information about the app seller’s behavior will induce uncertainty in the
consumer’s decision making. Thus, if the consumer perceives higher hidden action, it will lead to
high privacy uncertainty.
Hypothesis 6: A high level of perceived hidden action will increase level of
privacy uncertainty.
3.2.3

Hidden Effort

Hidden effort is post-contractual information asymmetry and is defined as the consumer’s
perceptions that the App-sellers may not spend enough effort to ensure consumer’s privacy.
When we consider hidden action, we think about malicious intent of the app-seller, whereas
Proceedings of the Ninth Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Auckland, New Zealand, 2014
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when we consider hidden effort we are concerned with true effort of the app-seller in actively
protecting consumer’s information. At the time of purchase, consumer seeks information that
can help her determine how the seller will protect the privacy of her information. Absence of
privacy information about protection may lead the consumer to believe that either the seller has
malicious intentions or the seller does not care about protecting consumer’s information. With
hidden action we can evaluate whether the consumers perceives malicious intent, however the
seller can just be careless. Since, the consumer has no window into how the seller actually
performs privacy practices; lack of any privacy information about protection will lead the
consumer to believe that seller will not be actively performing any effort to protect her
information’s privacy.
Hypothesis 7: Absence of information about “information protection” will
increase perception of hidden effort.
Lastly, if the consumer feels that she cannot determine whether the seller will exert
appropriate effort in protecting her information’s privacy, she will have high privacy uncertainty.
Hypothesis 8: A high level of perceived hidden effort will increase level of
privacy uncertainty.

4 Empirical Method
We employ a mixed design to test our hypotheses. Eight groups were formed based on 2x2x2
combination of availability (or not) of different privacy information (collection, use and
protection). The effect of absence of information on information asymmetry was tested within
subjects. All the control variables (such as privacy concerns, trust in app sellers, trust in app store
etc.) were measured before the subjects saw the experimental treatments. This allows for
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accurate calculation for the effect of treatment on dependent variables when we conduct repeated
measure ANOVA (Delaney and Maxwell 1981).
After the control variables were measured, subjects were presented with a tutorial to
familiarize them with different types of information and the location of information on the
screenshot. To ensure that subjects do not get primed by privacy information, subjects were
informed about all the information types, including information about app developers and
specific information about the app (such as app screenshots, rating and number of downloads).
Each subject evaluated an app buying scenario based on the treatment, which consisted of
one treatment information from among eight treatments. For instance, a subject was asked to
evaluate an app buying scenario in which there was no information about how the app will use
the collected information. Subjects evaluated the scenario and reported all the dependent
variables. This was followed by control treatment that contained all the privacy information
elements. Upon evaluating the control treatment, subjects reported all the dependent variables
again. Thus, all the dependent variables were measured twice, once with absence of certain
privacy information and once with presence of all the privacy information. A manipulation check
was also performed to determine whether subjects realized which information was missing.
Within Subject Measurements
Hidden Information
Hidden Action
Hidden Effort
Privacy Uncertainty
Willingness to Buy
Product Uncertainty
Seller Uncertainty

Between Subject Measurements
Trust
Privacy Concerns
Other Control Variables
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4.1

Results

The study was conducted on Amazon Turk, where 172 subjects took part in this study. Each
subject was randomly assigned one of the eight groups. On average, the subjects spend 12
minutes to complete the study. For privacy information, each of information type was coded ‘0’
when it was present and ’1’, when it was absent.
4.1.1

Effect of Information Treatment on Information Asymmetry

The effect of different information on dimensions of information asymmetry was tested
using repeated measures ANOVA. Table 1 shows the summary of hypotheses and the results.
Table1 : Summary of Test of Hypotheses
Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: In mobiles apps, privacy uncertainty reduces
willingness to buy.

Statistical
Method
Mixed Model
Analysis

Result

Hypothesis 2: Absence of information about “information
collection” will increase perception of hidden information.

Repeated
Measure ANOVA

Supported

Hypothesis 3: A high level of perceived hidden information will
increase level of privacy uncertainty.

Mixed Model
Analysis

Not
Supported

Hypothesis 4: Absence of information about “information use” will
increase the perception of hidden action.

Repeated
Measure ANOVA

Supported

Hypothesis 5: Absence of information about “information
protection” will increase the perception of hidden action.

Repeated
Measure ANOVA

Supported

Hypothesis 6: A high level of perceived hidden information will
increase level of privacy uncertainty.

Mixed Model
Analysis

Supported

Hypothesis 7: Absence of information about “information
protection” will increase perception of hidden effort.

Repeated
Measure ANOVA

Supported

Hypothesis 8: A high level of perceived hidden information will
increase level of privacy uncertainty.

Mixed Model
Analysis

Partially
Supported

Supported

Hypothesis 2 concerns the effect of information collection on hidden information. The effect
of Information Collection is significant F (1,172) = 10.64, p < .05. Hypotheses 4 and 5 were
tested in a similar fashion, where we predict the effect of information use on hidden action and
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hidden effort respectively. Both hypothesis are supported, where the effect of Information
Info
Use
on hidden action was significant,, F (1,172) = 271.05, p<.05 and the effect of Information
Info
Use on
hidden effort was also significant, F(1,172) = 87.45, p >.05. Lastly, hyp
hypothesis 7,
7 which concerns
the effect of information protection on hidden action was also supported, where the effect of
Information Protection on hidden action was significant, F (1,172) = 69.42, p>.05.
To test hypotheses 1, 3, 6 and 8 we employ a mixed model analysis. Figure 2 shows the
results for the test for these propositions. While the effects of hidden effort and hidden action are
significant, the effect of hidden information is not significant. Consequently,, the effect of postpost
purchase information asymmetry is more dominant that the effect of pre
pre-purchase
purchase information
asymmetry.

Figure 2. Results of Mixed Model Analysis
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5 Conclusion
We set out to show the privacy uncertainty is an independent construct which exists in presence
of seller uncertainty and product uncertainty. In addition, we wanted to delve deeper into privacy
uncertainty and determine its antecedents. Theoretically, we proposed that two different types if
information asymmetries can lead to privacy uncertainty. We conducted experiment in context of
mobile apps and find that privacy uncertainty is statistically significant construct. Moreover, our
empirical results show that in post-purchase is more important that pre-purchase information.
Theoretically we extend uncertainty literature in information systems and introduce privacy
uncertainty as an independent construct. In addition, we find with the ambit of post-purchase
information asymmetry, hidden effort is a dominant factor. This result has important implications
for practitioners: privacy practices in mobile apps should focus on pre-purchase information
asymmetry. For instance “notice and consent” mechanism only allows users to determine what
information is being collected. However, it does not provide a window into how the seller will
actually use the information.
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